Chapter 4
Regulation of Genetically Engineered
Microorganisms Under FIFRA,
FFDCA and TSCA by Wozniak, Chris A. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Papers U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2012
Chapter 4 Regulation of Genetically Engineered
Microorganisms Under FIFRA, FFDCA and
TSCA
Chris A. Wozniak
Office of Pesticide Programs , U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, wozniak.chris@epamail.epa.gov
Gwendolyn McClung
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics , U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, mcclung.gwendolyn@epa.gov
Joel Gagliardi
Office of Pesticide Programs , U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Gagliardi.joel@epa.gov
Mark Segal
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics , U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, segal.mark@epa.gov
Keith Matthews
Office of Pesticide Programs , U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, matthews.keith@epa.gov
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usepapapers
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Papers by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Wozniak, Chris A.; McClung, Gwendolyn; Gagliardi, Joel; Segal, Mark; and Matthews, Keith, "Chapter 4 Regulation of Genetically
Engineered Microorganisms Under FIFRA, FFDCA and TSCA" (2012). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Papers. 224.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usepapapers/224
57C.A. Wozniak and A. McHughen (eds.), Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology: 
The United States and Canada, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2156-2_4, 
© US Government 2012
 Abstract  Since the dawn of civilization, humans have utilized microbial organisms 
of various sorts for food and agricultural production. More recently, microbes have 
been used for pesticidal, and environmental management purposes. With the advent 
of the development of recombinant DNA technology to genetically alter microbes, 
it became necessary for Federal regulators to assess the appropriate level, format, and 
application of their regulatory authorities. In 1986, the Of fi ce of Science and Technology 
Policy issued the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. The 
Coordinated Framework constituted a comprehensive regulatory policy for biotech-
nology that, in essence, concluded that no new statutory authorities were necessary 
to effectuate a robust and ef fi cient regulatory program for the products of biotechnology. 
The Framework articulated a division of regulatory responsibilities for the various 
agencies then involved with agricultural, food, and pesticidal products. Thus, in 
accordance with the Framework, USDA APHIS regulates microbes that are plant 
pests under the Plant Protection Act (PPA) and the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA); the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) regulates 
microorganisms and other genetically engineered constructs intended for pesticidal 
purposes and subject to the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) and the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). The U.S. EPA 
also regulates certain genetically engineered microorganisms used as biofertilizers, 
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bioremediation agents, and for the production of various industrial compounds 
including biofuels under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The focus of 
this chapter is the regulatory process for approval of the use of genetically engi-
neered microbes under the oversight of the U.S. EPA. We will also consider instances 
where organisms may be exempted from oversight and the outlook for the applica-
tion of GE microbes in the future. This chapter does not seek to serve as a guide-
book for navigating the details of the regulatory process, but rather as an overview 
of key considerations in risk assessment and risk management. 
 Keywords  Algae •  Bacteria •  Baculovirus •  Biofertilizer •  Biofuel •  Biopesticide • 
 FFDCA •  FIFRA •  Fungi •  Genetically engineered •  Microorganism •  MPCA •  Plant 
pest •  Plant protection act •  Regulation •  TSCA 
 Disclaimer 
 The content of this chapter re fl ects the opinions of the authors and this chapter is not 
intended to constitute a statement of the of fi cial policy or actions of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
 4.1  Introduction 
 4.1.1  Historical Regulatory Perspective 
 The regulation of products of biotechnology has a lengthy history in the United 
States. Prior to the development of a formal regulatory structure, many protracted 
discussions took place for well over a decade among scientists, government regulators, 
environmental activists, and representatives of industry (Berg and Singer  1995 ; 
Barinaga  2000 ) . These discussions eventually resulted in the announcement by the 
Of fi ce of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) of the Coordinated Framework 
for Regulation of Biotechnology  ( OSTP  1986 ) . 
 In February 1975, the Asilomar Conference was convened with 140 scientists, 
lawyers, physicians, ethicists and other interested parties in Monterey, CA for a 
comprehensive discussion of the issues surrounding the release of genetically engi-
neered organisms into the environment. A growing sense of concern was mounting 
among scientists regarding this new ability to reshuf fl e DNA between microbial 
agents and this was a major impetus for the conference. While a formal regulatory 
system would have to wait for further executive and legislative decisions, the 
Congress at Asilomar helped focus the publication of the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) Recombinant DNA Guidelines in 1976 (NIH  1976 ) , even though this 
project was already underway (Marchant  1988 ) . The primary utility of the ‘NIH 
Guidelines’, as they came to be known, related to con fi ned applications, e.g., laboratory 
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work for research purposes. Recognizing, however, that the NIH Guidelines did not 
provide genuine oversight for actual environmental releases of GE microbes, Federal 
regulatory agencies were considering appropriate means of adequately regulating 
such releases. (It should be noted that the NIH Guidelines are still in effect, with 
some modi fi cations over the years, for their original intended purpose; NIH  2011 ) . 
 The principal tenet of the Coordinated Framework was that existing statutes were 
suf fi cient to effectuate proper regulation of the products of agricultural biotechnology, 
i.e., that it was not necessary to legislatively create new statutory authorities 
speci fi cally for the governance of products in the research pipeline and those that 
where then envisioned. Existing statutes were considered as a sound basis for oversight 
of biotechnology with modi fi cations offered through promulgation of regulations 
via rulemaking. 
 Given the plethora of potential products to be derived from rDNA technology, 
the U.S. government was faced with the application of statutes already in use for 
regulation of pesticides (i.e., FIFRA), plant pests (i.e., Plant Pest Act) and pesticide 
residues on food and feed commodities (i.e., Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act) 
with implications for the associated agencies, EPA, USDA-APHIS, HHS-FDA, 
respectively. There were, of course, dissenting views as to whether relying on existing 
statutes was either suf fi cient or preferable with regard to necessary regulatory 
authorities applicable to these technologies and resulting products (Jones  1999 ) . 
 Environmental releases of genetically modi fi ed organisms were proposed for the 
 fi rst time nearly simultaneously by Monsanto and Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc. 
(AGS) (Watrud et al.  1985 ; Lindow  1985 ) . AGS developed a product named FrostBan ® , 
a  Pseudomonas syringae engineered such that a gene coding for a protein necessary 
for ice-nucleation had been deleted, and conducted a  fi eld release on strawberry  fi elds 
in University of California experimental plots under EPA and California Department 
of Food and Agriculture authority on April 24, 1987 (Smith  1997 ) . 
 Initial approval granted by the NIH administrator (48FR9436; 48FR:24548) for 
this  fi eld test was overturned due to a May 16, 1984 decision (OTA  1988 ) that the 
environmental impacts under NEPA were not assessed, though the decision also 
af fi rmed that  fi eld testing could take place once an environmental effects assess-
ment was performed (Pizzuli  1984 ) . Through a series of events EPA was assigned 
the task of assessing environmental impacts, though the permit was withdrawn 
just prior to the 1987  fi eld test when another test, this one an experimental rooftop 
injection of Frostban ® into trees, was declared in violation of the issued permit 
resulting in a $20,000  fi ne – though AGS claimed the bacterium injected into trees 
was a contained use (New Scientist  1986 ) . A  fi eld test of Frostban ® on strawberry 
plants did occur at Conta Costa, CA following Federal and State approvals (Supkoff 
et al.  1988 ) . Steve Lindow of the University of California at Berkeley also conducted 
frost prevention tests with his deletion mutant IceMinus  Ps. syringae on potato 
plants at Tulelake, CA despite some vandalism by opponents of GE technology and 
a lengthy permitting process (Maugh  1987 ) . 
 A subsequent genetically engineered construct involved transformation systems 
directing placement of  Bacillus thuringiensis (B.t.) transgenic sequences into the 
bacterial chromosomes of  Clavibacter xyli ssp.  cynodontis and  Pseudomonas 
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 fl uorescens , respectively. A system devised by Crop Genetics International (CGI) 
focused on delivery of the B.t. Cry1Ac  d -endotoxin in tissues of maize by introducing 
genetically modi fi ed  C. xyli into maize xylem vessels ( Turner et al.  1991 ).  C. xyli is 
a natural endophyte of Bermuda grass, maize and several other plants, hence, its 
potential as a delivery agent of a biopesticidal protein was sought as a means of 
reducing feeding damage to corn earworm and European corn borers and as a way 
to reduce environmental exposure to non-target organisms (Lampel et al.  1994 ) . 
Due in part to the overall concentration of the B.t.  d -endotoxin contained in the 
endophytic populations of  C. xyli in maize, this construct ultimately failed to con-
sistently deliver suf fi cient control during  fi eld trials. In addition, there were serious 
concerns about the possible uncontrolled spread of the genetically engineered 
microorganism to other plants. Yield was also affected in some maize varieties 
because of occlusion of xylem vessels with bacteria, particularly when drought 
stress was an issue (John Turner, personal communication  2011 ). Regulatory costs 
associated with  fi eld release permits (USDA-APHIS) and experimental use permits 
(US EPA) were a factor for CGI in that they were a relatively small company without 
a broad portfolio of products. In 1994, further research into this mechanism of delivery 
into maize was halted by CGI (Wrubel et al.  1997 ) . 
 Monsanto’s approach was to create an insecticidal, plant rhizosphere dwelling 
microbe by cloning the  Bacillus thuringiensis subsp.  kurstaki HD-1 crystalline 
protein gene into strains of  Pseudomonas  fl uorescens (Obukowicz et al.  1986 ) . 
Limited  fi eld releases of these live microorganisms occurred, though only with 
strain variants engineered with reporter genes (Kleupfel et al.  1991 ; Angle et al. 
 1995 ; Gagliardi et al.  2001 ) . EPA questioned the safety of pseudomonads expressing 
B.t. endotoxins in aquatic environments, and this led to Monsanto’s decision to cease 
work on use of engineered microbes as pesticides. Subsequent work in contained 
settings has shown that runoff from simulated agricultural plots containing 
 Pseudomonas chlororaphis ( aureofaciens ) 3732 can be signi fi cant (Gillespie et al. 
 1995 ) , and the general lack of available non-target aquatic invertebrate tests to evaluate 
such effects leaves regulatory certainty for this use in limbo. 
 Subsequently, between 1991 and 1996, four genetically engineered microbial prep-
arations were registered under FIFRA as encapsulated  B. thuringiensis  d -endotoxins 
in killed  Pseudomonas  fl uorescens . Delivery of the B.t.  d -endotoxin in killed 
 Pseudomonas had a distinct advantage over using live  B. thuringiensis in that higher 
levels of toxins are produced by the pseudomonads during fermentations and some 
protection against UV light inactivation of the toxin was gained via encapsulation 
within the killed pseudomonad cell wall (OTA  1995 ; Mycogen  1998 ;  Shand  1989 ) . 
Additionally, the use of killed bacteria as the end product alleviates any concerns 
over spread and reproduction of the engineered pseudomonad; this was a consider-
ation by both the company and EPA risk assessors (BLR  1988 ) . 
 In addition to the transgeneric expression of B.t.  d -endotoxin genes in the heat-
killed pseudomonads, creating a so called ‘killed microbial’ pesticide, several com-
panies moved forward with engineering of  B .  thuringiensis strains directly, either 
modifying native  cry gene sequences or adding to the resident  cry genes with additional 
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 cry genes in order to broaden the range of susceptible insect species (Baum et al.  1996 ; 
 Sanahuja et al.  2011 ) . 
 In addition to these pseudomonad constructs, six submissions were received by 
EPA for  fi eld testing of genetically modi fi ed baculoviruses from May 1995 through 
August of 1998. Four of these utilized the  Autographa californica nuclear polyhe-
drosis virus (AcMNPV) with additions of insect-speci fi c toxin genes: three from 
two different scorpions (Summers  2006 ) and one from a mite (Tomalski et al.  1989 ) . 
Two others are based upon modi fi ed  Helicoverpa zea single-embedded nuclear 
polyhedrosis virus (HzSNPV) each using an insect-speci fi c scorpion toxin from one 
of two scorpion species. Since the main issues are very similar between the various 
baculovirus constructs, only a few examples will be discussed in detail herein. 
 Work with engineered baculoviruses was quite active in the 1990s (Hughes et al. 
 1997 ) , and even earlier in the UK (Bishop  1988 ) for control of insect pests on 
vegetables, ornamentals, and in forestry situations, and some of this work continues 
today (Tang et al.  2011 ) . Much of the effort centered on addition of scorpion toxin 
genes to enhance the kill rate of AcMNPV and HzNPV without a consequent change 
in host range. Toxins from both  Leiurus quinquestriatus hebraeus (Israeili yellow 
scorpion; LqhIT2) and  Androctonus australis hector (Algerian scorpion; AaIT) 
were used by American Cyanamid and DuPont in an attempt to increase mortality 
in the target pest without altering the risk pro fi le for non-target species that may 
feed on the infected insect pests (Bill Schneider, Personal Communication  2010 ; 
Gard et al.  2002 ; Heinz et al.  1995 ; American Cyanamid  1994,  1996 ; DuPont  1996 ; 
Kunimi et al.  1996 ) . 
 These scorpion toxins act through either a depressant (LqhIT2) or stimulant 
(AaIT) capacity on neurons through sodium channel modulation, however, they do 
not have demonstrable vertebrate activity nor do they affect Crustacea (Hoover et al. 
 1996 ; Gard et al.  2002 ) . EPA required testing of a range of surrogate species, includ-
ing rats, Bobwhite quail, Mallard ducks, rainbow trout, and grass shrimp, which 
were fed infected  H. zea larvae. Additional tests with NPV occlusion bodies (OBs) 
suspended in aqueous media indicated a lack of pathogenic or toxic effect on 
 Daphnia magna , the water  fl ea. Testing of human cell lines (liver, lung, intestine) 
was also performed with budding virus particles with no indication of alterations to 
cell morphology or timing of division. It is noteworthy that although guidance on 
assessing human health and environmental risks has adapted to newer technologies 
as they arose, many of the principals have been in place prior to the advent of bio-
technology and rDNA methods (Engler  1974 ) . 
 Additionally, the ecdysteroid UDP-glucosyl transferase gene ( egt ) had been 
found to alter ecdysoid hormone levels and in fl uence killing rate, feeding period 
and molting of several insect species (O’Reilly and Miller  1989,  1991 ; Slavicek 
et al.  1999 ) . Removal of the  egt gene from the AcMNPV genome resulted in feeding 
cessation and wandering behavior of infected larvae, which succumbed to the viral 
infection prior to pupation. The combination of the AcMNPV/LqhIT2 toxin and 
deletion of  egt resulted in a higher mortality rate during initial measurements soon 
after infection experiments comparing recombinant strains to wild type AcMNPV, 
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however, following extended incubation (e.g. a few days post infection to as many 
as 21 days depending on the virus:insect combination), mortality was equal between 
the two groups. The titer of occlusion bodies present in the AcMNPV/LqhIT2 strain 
was, however, signi fi cantly less than wild type infections (Tomalski and Miller 
 1991 ; Cory et al.  1994 ) . Depending on the strain of virus and the intended host, 
reductions in yield of virus have varied from 30 to 50% and the rate of kill 
increased by as much as 95% (Cory  2000 ) . The decreased viral load following 
infection and the limited host range of most baculoviruses  fi t prominently into the 
EPA’s risk assessment for these modi fi ed biopesticides. The inability of these geneti-
cally engineered baculoviruses to persist in the environment and potentially 
exchange genes with wild type strains or related viruses reduced the uncertainty 
associated with  fi eld release of constructs previously evaluated in laboratory settings 
(OSTP  2001 ) . 
 Another consideration of the risk assessment for AcMNPV/LqhIT2 and other 
recombinant baculoviruses was whether these novel strains could outcompete and 
eliminate wild type viruses over time. In addition to the noted decrease in viral load 
following host mortality, experiments and observations demonstrated that larvae 
infected with AcMNPV expressing insect-speci fi c toxins were susceptible to 
‘knockoff’ wherein they would drop from plant surfaces hours earlier than wild type 
infected larvae, thereby limiting spread of the OBs onto leaf surfaces where they 
may contact other larvae (Inceoglu et al.  2006 ) . Further experiments with combinations 
of GE and wild-type NPVs also indicated that sequential passage to larval hosts 
resulted in the eventual elimination of the toxin expressing virus strains. In some 
instances, the GE baculoviruses were comparable in ef fi cacy to conventional 
insecticides with a 30–40% increase in the speed of killing larvae as compared to 
non-GE baculoviruses (Hoover et al.  1996 ) . 
 Shortly after the initial proposed  fi eld releases, non-pesticidal uses of genetically 
modi fi ed microorganisms began to be developed. By 1987 initial releases of  Ensifer 
( Rhizobium )  meliloti were under TSCA review and initial experimental releases took 
place by 1988 (EPA  1999 ) . The Monsanto  Pseudomonas chlororaphis ( aureofaciens ) 
strain containing reporter genes was also submitted for TSCA review in 1987 and 
went to the  fi eld that same year. 
 While this chapter considers the oversight of GE microorganisms by the US 
EPA, it should be noted that some of these organisms may also be regulated by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(USDA-APHIS). Both the Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) and the 
Biotechnology Regulatory Services (BRS) divisions within USDA-APHIS may be 
involved in the importation, movement and  fi eld release of non-GE and GE micro-
organisms under the Plant Protection Act and National Environmental Policy Act 
(OSTP  2001 ) . The Food and Drug Administration reviews all genetically engineered 
microorganisms that may cause an alteration in the nutritional state of a food, or 
otherwise contribute to a food safety issue. When in doubt as to which agencies may 
exercise regulatory authority over a particular microbe and its intended use, it is best 
to contact the agency directly for clari fi cation. 
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 4.2  FIFRA Risk Assessment of Genetically Engineered 
Microbial Pest Control Agents 
 Under FIFRA, microbial biopesticide products, as with all other pesticides, must be 
evaluated for their risks and bene fi ts. Bacteria, viruses, protozoa, algae, and fungi 
intended for use as pesticides are regulated under FIFRA by the US EPA (40 CFR Part 
158.2100). Additionally, the Agency evaluates the potential for effects upon threatened 
and endangered species under the Endangered Species Act, but this will not be discussed 
further in this section. There are three principal sections to the FIFRA risk assessment 
for genetically engineered microbial pest control agents (GE-MPCA): product analysis, 
human health, and environmental considerations (McLintock et al.  2000 ) . The aim of 
this chapter is not to consider the data requirements associated with these sections in 
great detail, but, rather, to present an overview of key considerations. One important 
note: EPA evaluates an MPCA using the same data requirements, regardless of whether 
it is genetically engineered or naturally occurring (Baum  1998 ) . 
 Under the product characterization section (40 CFR Part 158.2120) of the data require-
ments a summary of the taxonomy, natural history, target, and non-target host range is 
required. For any genetically modi fi ed MPCA, the product analysis portion of the data 
requirements seeks to provide the risk assessor with necessary information regarding the 
nature of the transformation event and includes DNA sequences of transgenes, associated 
vector sequences with restriction map, DNA source information and an indication of 
transgene stability over multiple generations or growth cycles (e.g., 5 batch analysis). 
Also critical to this section is the Con fi dential Statement of Formula, which details the 
active ingredient(s), inert ingredients, and concentration of the MPCA in its  fi nal product 
formulation. Any pesticide in use under a FIFRA Section 5 Experimental Use Permit, or 
Section 3 Registration, which is not in accord with the information present on the CSF is 
considered as ‘Misbranded’ and therefore illegal (FIFRA 2(q)). 
 Toxicology data requirements (40 CFR, Part 158.2140) explore the potential 
impact of the MPCA on humans in terms of toxicity, infectivity and pathogenicity. 
The MPCA is introduced via oral, pulmonary, and injection (intravenous or 
intraperitoneal) routes into rodent test animals functioning as surrogates. Animal 
body and organ weights, behavior, and mortality are all assessed as part of these 
studies, but most important is establishing clearance of the MPCA from the body 
over time. These high dose tests (at least 10 8 units of the MPCA per test animal) are 
intended to examine the outcomes following a single, signi fi cant contact with an 
MPCA by various exposure routes (mouth, nose, lungs, and dermal). 
 Non-target organism and environmental fate data requirements (40 CFR, Part 
158.2150) evaluate the potential for the MPCA to impact organisms beyond the 
intended target pest(s). These studies require examination of pathogenicity on 
related (e.g., other insects) and unrelated (e.g., plants, birds, and mammals) organisms. 
The organisms chosen for study are functioning as surrogates, representative of 
broader groupings (e.g., Mallard duck for birds in general), and include wild mammals, 
birds,  fi sh, bene fi cial insects, aquatic invertebrates, estuarine and marine organisms 
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( fi sh and invertebrates), plants, and honeybee testing. In accord with 40 CFR, Part 
158.30, the Agency has  fl exibility in determining which of these data requirements 
must be in the form of generated data or related information, and which can be 
satis fi ed by waiver rationale. 
 The Environmental Fate data requirements focus on the fate of the organism in the 
area of application to determine the ability to persist and where the organism exists 
(e.g., in soil, associated with insects, etc.). The survivability and host range of an organ-
ism are key to understanding the ability of an MPCA to persist in the environment and 
potentially result in adverse effects (Hu and St. Leger  2002 ; 40 CFR 172.45(e)). For 
example, release of entomopathogens may require monitoring of resident arthropods 
to determine the ability to colonize and infect as a means of assessing persistence 
(St. Leger et al.  1996 ) . Reproduction (e.g., sporulation) on cadavers of target hosts or 
lack thereof can be helpful in ascertaining the ability of the MPCA to persist following 
small scale release. Rhizospheric competence was also assessed with another set of 
constructs in  M. anisopliae (now  M .  robertsii, J.F. Bisch., Rehner & Humber) as part of 
an investigation into survivorship in the environment (Hu and St. Leger  2002 ) . 
 As with all pesticides applied to food or feed crops, a food tolerance or the exemption 
from the requirement of a food tolerance must be in place if any residues of the pesticide 
may be present on any food derived from the crop. In all cases to date, the MPCAs 
registered by the Agency have been granted an exemption from the requirement for a 
tolerance based upon a determination that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm 
will result from dietary exposure to the MPCA. In general, pesticides containing 
elements of any of the eight major allergens are not approved for use on most food or 
feed crops, which could also extend to any expressed proteins originating from peanuts, 
tree nuts, milk, soybeans, eggs,  fi sh, Crustacea, and wheat (40CFR 180.950). 
 While the same set of data requirements are imposed upon naturally occurring 
and GE microbial agents, genetically modi fi ed MPCA and non-indigenous micro-
bial species may be subject to additional data or information requirements on a 
case-by-case basis depending on the particular microbial agent and/or its parental 
strains, the proposed pesticide use pattern, and the manner and extent to which the 
organism has been genetically modi fi ed (FR  2007 ) . 
 4.2.1  Biotechnology Noti fi cation Process 
for Microbial Pest Control Agents 
 At least 90 days prior to conducting any small scale test of a genetically modi fi ed 
microbial pesticide, other than those described at 40 CFR 172.45(d), a Noti fi cation 
must be submitted to the EPA in which the details of the genetic modi fi cation, proposed 
application methods and sites, and any potential toxicity or non-target organism effects 
are delineated. 40 CFR 172, subpart C. Measures must also be outlined in the 
Noti fi cation submission which indicate the methods of containment and monitoring 
used to ensure the GEO does not become established in the ecosystem. 40 CFR 172.48. 
The data required to support a request for a Noti fi cation are detailed in 40 CFR Part 
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172.48 (FR 59, 169, Sept. 1,  1994 ) . If the proposed  fi eld test is to be greater than10 
acres of treated land per pest evaluated or greater than1 acre, for aquatic uses, then an 
experimental use permit is necessary. 40 CFR 172.3. 
 Under FIFRA, a Biotechnology Noti fi cation Process (40 CFR, Part 172.43; BNP) 
for release of a GE-MPCA at any size test plot requires review and approval by the 
EPA prior to commencing experimentation. EPA requires noti fi cation prior to small 
scale  fi eld testing of genetically engineered and non-indigenous microorganisms not 
subject to USDA oversight to allow EPA to determine if an Experimental Use Permit 
is needed and to allow the applicant to gather data critical to the risk assessment pro-
cess. Processing times for review and approval of BNP applications are considerably 
shorter than those encountered with Experimental Use Permits (EUPs) and Section 3 
registrations, and they are intended for smaller (e.g.,  £ 1 A)  fi eld test plots than EUPs. 
It must be emphasized that with BNP approvals, any treated plants or materials are 
prohibited from entry into the food and feed supply unless a food tolerance or exemption 
from the requirement of a food tolerance under Section 408 of FFDCA is in place; 
these environmental releases are strictly for research purposes only. The treated 
produce of a BNP or EUP may be allowed for consumption by experimental animals, 
however, the products of those animals are not allowed for entry into the food or feed 
supply unless an appropriate food tolerance action is in place. 
 Several GE MPCA have been through the BNP successfully and  fi eld tested on a 
small scale (See Table  4.1 ). This includes the  fi rst approved  fi eld test of a GE 
microbe, strains of  Pseudomonas syringae and  Erwinia herbicola with an ice-minus 
phenotype applied to potatoes as a means of preventing frost and its associated 
plant damage ( Lindow and Panopoulos  1988 ; Milewski  1987 ) . Advanced Genetic 
Sciences (AGS) had engineered a  Ps .  syringae resulting in the absence of expression 
of a membrane protein responsible for ice nucleation, though the product currently 
marketed as ‘Frostban ® ’ is not genetically engineered and is a naturally occurring 
ice-minus strain. Another wildtype ice + strain of  Ps. syringae is also marketed, as 
‘Snowmax’ and is utilized in arti fi cial snow-making operations, however, it is not 
regulated as an MPCA. 
 Other successful BNP environmental releases include two  Metarhizium 
anisopliae strains modi fi ed to enhance virulence through addition of native protease 
genes (St. Leger et al.  1996 ) and, in a separate BNP, a gene derived from the scorpion 
 Androctonus australis encoding a known neurotoxin active against tobacco hornworm 
(Wang and St. Leger  2007 ) . 
 4.2.2  Experimental Use Permits for Microbial Pest 
Control Agents 
 When testing a MPCA at 10 acres or more (1 A or more for aquatic use), EPA requires 
an Experimental Use Permit before  fi eld testing naturally occurring or genetically 
engineered MPCA (40 CFR Part 158.2170; 40 CFR Part 172.3). EUPs for GE-MPCA 
typically involve larger acreages than those approved under a BNP; however, pesticide 
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products used under an EUP also require an approved label for experimental use and 
interstate shipment (40 CFR Part 172.6); this is not the case for BNP testing. Several 
genetically modi fi ed biopesticides have been approved for use under EUPs; but, a number 
of these were never actually applied or in some cases only sparingly applied (Table  4.1 ). 
The reasons for this relate to issues of public perception (i.e., is the company or researcher 
willing to deal with public meetings and scrutiny?) and business decisions (e.g., is there 
suf fi cient market potential to warrant the development and regulatory costs?). 
 The data requirements for an EUP involving GE-MPCA are discussed at 40 CFR 
Part 174.3 and the speci fi c tests, also germane to non-GE MPCA, are described in 
158.2171–158.2174. In general, the data requirements for an EUP or Section 3 
registration are similar, however, the limited exposure to the environment from the 
small scale  fi eld testing of an MPCA under an EUP does not require the same level 
of non-target organism testing as when full commercial registration is approved 
through registration procedures. This is due in large part to the limited scope of the 
environmental release at the EUP stage and the fact that much of the non-target 
effects information may be collected as part of the EUP overall plan. 
 4.2.3  Section 3 Registration of Microbial Pest Control Agents 
 Before any microbial pesticide registration is granted under FIFRA, EPA considers 
such issues as potential adverse effects to non-target organisms, environmental fate 
of the microorganism, and the potential toxicity, pathogenicity and infectivity of the 
microorganism to humans and other animals. These issues are the same as those 
considered for non-engineered microbial agents approved for pest management, 
and re fl ect the inherent similarities of the functional properties of the organism 
regardless of whether the traits of primary interest are derived from rDNA or not. 
 The data requirements for registration of a microbial biopesticide are delimited in 40 
CFR 158.2120–158.2150. The data and information garnered from the ful fi llment of 
these data requirements are used to inform the risk assessment process, just as with the 
EUP and BNP applications. All of the data requirements must be satis fi ed for a FIFRA 
Section 3 registration, however, in some instances rationale can be provided by the 
registrant to explain why the requirement is not applicable to the MPCA in question. 
For example, a psychrotropic bacterium which does not grow at temperatures greater 
than 20 °C is unlikely to result in mammalian pathogenicity given the body temperature 
of these animals, including man. Similarly, a microbial biopesticide labeled for use at 
residential sites only is unlikely to result in signi fi cant exposure to marine and estuarine 
environments. Explanation of factors affecting the applicability of a study outcome to a 
risk determination may be used to satisfy some data requirements. As always, it is 
important to discuss this with regulators prior to conducting any studies. 
 Relative to a BPN or an EUP, the number of studies requiring empirical data 
generation applied to the issuance of a Section 3 registration are typically greater as 
this regulatory action often coincides with commercial use on a larger scale than 
either of the two preceding regulatory actions. For both BPN and EUP actions, the 
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scope of the exposure of man and the environment to the novel pesticide is 
signi fi cantly reduced as compared to commercial use in most instances. Hence, the 
data and information required for an EUP or small scale  fi eld test under a BPN are 
more often limited to concerns of human health (e.g., infectivity) and environmental 
persistence than with longer term non-target effects, which will be addressed at the 
time of registration, with data obtained through earlier  fi eld tests in most cases. 
 It should be noted that all pesticide registrations are subject to periodic review 
and re-registration procedures as FIFRA is a licensing statute and statutory require-
ments exist in order to maintain that license or registration in good standing in order 
to enter the product into commerce. 
 The  fi rst genetically engineered MPCA registered under FIFRA was a pair of 
 Pseudomonas  fl uorescens strains, each modi fi ed with a different type of  d -endotoxin 
from  B .  thuringiensis, for insect control. Mycogen chose to express their  kurstaki 
and  san diego type endotoxins in  Ps .  fl uorescens to provide for adequate expression 
and accumulation of protein toxin, but also as a means of reducing inactivation of 
these proteins by ultraviolet light. These products were referred to as MVP and 
M-Trak, respectively, and did not contain any live organisms, so the risk assessment 
was not concerned with pathogenicity or infectivity issues. 
 4.3  Risk Assessment Considerations 
 4.3.1  FIFRA 
 As noted above, FIFRA’s standard for registration decisions involves an assessment of 
risks and bene fi ts of using a pesticide. This is to include a biological analysis of potential 
effects upon man and the environment as well as social and economic considerations 
resulting from a regulatory decision. The inclusion of an explicit risk-bene fi t calculation 
distinguishes FIFRA from most other U.S. environmental statutes. 
 One of the primary bene fi ts of a biopesticide is the replacement of control 
measures that may pose greater risks, such as groundwater contamination, toxicity 
to non-target organisms, or dietary risks to infants and children. To date, decisions 
to approve nuclear polyhedrosis viruses (NPVs), plant viruses and bacteriophage 
have relied primarily on their lack of toxicity to all organisms except target pests 
with little or no animal testing conducted. EPA considers possible bene fi ts that 
might result from use of viruses such as the NPV AcMNPV/LqhIT2 (OSTP  2001 ) . 
Application of AcMNPV/LqhIT2 would likely reduce the use of other insecticides 
and thereby would avoid the types of impacts those less speci fi c insecticides might 
have had, if applied to the same acreage as AcMNPV/LqhIT2. 
 Targeting an insect-speci fi c toxin to the ‘point of feeding’ of pest insects should 
minimize the impact on non-target organisms and minimize ground water contami-
nation, as may occur with use of more environmentally persistent chemical pesticides. 
Because many of the previously deployed insecticides were broad-spectrum in their 
activities, the potential for impacts on the bene fi cial insect populations was signi fi cant. 
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Populations of bene fi cial insects should increase over time as more MPCAs with 
host speci fi city are used and fewer broad-spectrum pesticides are applied. This has 
been shown in the context of B.t. corn crops, where increased abundance of arthro-
pods was noted in B.t crop  fi elds when compared to conventionally bred maize treated 
with insecticides (Marvier et al.  2007 ) . Since some insecticides have effects on non-
insect organisms (e.g. earthworms, nematodes), the reduction or elimination of these 
broad-spectrum pesticides will help to nurture these populations as long as cultural 
practices of soil management are adequate. 
 Additionally, the exposure of farm workers, pesticide applicators and the public 
at-large is often reduced when a biological pesticide takes the place of a chemical 
spray alternative. For example, residues on food are less of a concern with AcMNPV/
LqhIT2, because the insect neurotoxin is known to be non-toxic to humans and 
other mammals. Spray drift is often problematic with chemical applications, but this 
is not a signi fi cant issue with target speci fi c NPVs. 
 FIFRA also requires special consideration of public health pests, such as disease 
vectoring mosquitoes, cockroaches and rodents. Data detailing the ability of the 
MPCA to manage a pest situation are required for all registrations, however, these 
data must be submitted and reviewed for those involving public health pests prior to 
any such regulatory action being considered. 
 4.3.2  FFDCA 
 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is largely the purview of the US Food and 
Drug Administration, except for residues of pesticides that may occur in food and feed 
(Section 408, FFDCA). Microbial biopesticides that pass Tier I testing without evidence 
of toxicity or pathogenicity will most often qualify for an exemption from the require-
ment of a numerical food tolerance (also referred to as a Maximum Residue Level in 
some countries). This regulatory action, determined following risk assessment and 
literature review, has afforded the determination that any level of the microbe present in 
food and feed resulting from use of the product as speci fi ed on the FIFRA label, will not 
result in harm by a variety of exposures. Among the exposure scenarios assessed for 
food safety are ingestion through food or water, inhalation, dermal and eye contact, 
and injection. While effects may be evident in some of these tests, the probability of 
exposure is also a consideration. Speci fi c areas addressed under FFDCA (as applicable 
to microbial pesticides) are acute, subchronic and chronic dietary risks, occupational 
exposures, drinking water exposures, effects to the immune and endocrine systems, any 
dose response related information, exposures associated with day cares, residences and 
schools, exposure of sensitive populations, such as infants or children, aggregate effects 
for multiple exposures, and cumulative effects. 
 When assessing MPCA, there are the three endpoints of concern: infectivity, 
pathogenicity and toxicity. In some cases an analysis of potentially toxic metabolites 
is included in the food safety risk assessment and review of the primary literature. 
Some microbial species are known to produce metabolites or toxins which can have 
adverse effects upon man and livestock following consumption. 
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 Note, if an organism is not completely identi fi ed or is closely related to a human 
pathogen, i.e., in the same genus, the literature review and subsequent risk assessment 
should be broad enough to cover the eventuality that the relevant pathogenicity 
factors and/or toxins are ruled out as not present in the test strains proposed for use 
as a pesticide. 
 4.4  Entomopathogenic Nematodes  
 Entomopathogenic nematodes have been applied to pest management of insects in 
diverse agricultural settings (de Doucet et al.  1998 ; Head et al.  2000 ; Martin  1997 ) . 
While the number of nematode genera infecting insects and other arthropods is 
large and diverse, most of the research and development interest has been with the 
Steinernematid and Heterorhabditid groups targeting agricultural insect pests 
(Grewal and Peters  2005 ) . Both of these genera rely on symbiotic (phoretic) bacteria 
to effect a lethal septicemia upon their hosts which results in degradation of internal 
tissues and organs, death of the insect host, and reproduction of the nematode and 
symbionts. 
 Members of the genera  Steinernema and  Heterorhabditis differ in their strat-
egies of host location, host speci fi city, and survival mechanisms, they are both 
inherently susceptible to heat and desiccation in the soil environment. As a means 
of enhancing the heat tolerance of  Heterorhabditis bacteriophora , an hsp70A gene 
from  Caenorhabditis elegans was introduced to juvenile nematodes (Hashmi et al. 
 1995 ; Wilson et al.  1999 ) . Although this effort was ultimately not successful at the 
 fi eld level in providing the necessary level of heat tolerance, it nonetheless raised 
some interesting regulatory issues (Gaugler et al.  1997 ) . 
 The Code of Federal Regulations de fi nes microorganisms considered as biopes-
ticides to include viruses, bacteria, protozoa, algae and fungi (FR  2007 ) . Absent 
from this list are nematodes and certain other microscopic, multicellular invertebrates. 
Nematodes may be included as biocontrol agents subject to oversight under the 
Plant Pest Act, yet this is less than apparent. 
 According to the Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology (OSTP  1986 ) when 
referring to EPA’s oversight, “The Agency has determined that certain non-microbial 
organisms which fall within the de fi nition of biological control agents are already 
addressed by other agencies, speci fi cally USDA and the Department of the Interior. 
Examples of these biological control agents are vertebrates, insect predators, nematodes, 
and macroscopic parasites. Therefore, pursuant to section 25(b) of FIFRA and 40 
CFR 162.5(c)(4), these nonmicrobial biological control agents have been exempted 
from regulation under FIFRA. However, if EPA, in cooperation with other agencies, 
determines that certain biological control agents exempted by § 162.5(c)(4) are not 
being adequately regulated, these organisms will be referred to the attention of 
the appropriate agency or added to the exceptions in § 162.5(c)(4) by amendment. 
In the latter case, those organisms would no longer be considered exempt from the 
provisions of FIFRA.” 
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 While entomopathogenic nematodes are included in this exemption, genetic 
engineering of either the nematode or the microbial symbiont could bring the new 
product back under FIFRA oversight as a pesticide. 
 Genetic engineering of the microbial symbionts (i.e.,  Xenorhabdus spp.; 
 Photorhabdus spp.) would bring these organisms under the regulatory umbrella of 
the USDA-APHIS and EPA, however, modi fi cation of the nematode itself does not 
meet existing regulatory thresholds (FR  2007 ; Gaugler et al.  1997 ; Gaugler, personal 
communication). It should be noted that in the U.S., the importation and interstate 
movement of exotic entomopathogenic nematodes may be regulated by the USDA-
APHIS’ Plant Protection and Quarantine group (Rizvi et al.  1996 ; Selçuk et al.  2003 ) 
under the Plant Protection Act of 2000. 
 During laboratory and growth chamber experimentation with the  H .  bacteriophora 
hsp70A transformants, this issue was raised to the USDA-APHIS and EPA-BPPD for 
clari fi cation (Randy Gaugler, personal communication; Chris Wozniak, personal 
communication). At the time, neither agency indicated jurisdictional oversight of 
these GE nematodes, but suggested that the Center for Disease Control be contacted 
as well. Communication with CDC (Wozniak, personal communication) likewise 
indicated that they did not claim oversight of the organisms for the intended purpose 
(i.e., pest control). 
 Faced with this lack of Federal oversight, yet concerned with public perception 
and local (i.e., State, University Institutional Biosafety Committees) considerations, 
the lead investigator, Dr. Randy Gaugler of Rutgers University, requested a review 
of the  H .  bacteriophora hsp 70A, as applied to insect pest management, by the 
USDA-APHIS. This review resulted in a  fi nding of no signi fi cant impact (FONSI) 
by the agency and a determination that environmental release would not result in 
injury to agricultural plants or their products as determined under the Plant Pest Act. 
Note that this  fi nding does not preclude potential regulatory action by State or other 
local authorities, as is the case with all microorganisms, including pesticidal agents, 
intended for release into the environment. 
 While the lack of Federal regulation has obviously reduced costs and time 
necessary to bring an entomopathogenic nematode product to market, some have 
opined that this lack of oversight has resulted in some inferior products with 
exaggerated claims ( Weinzierl et al.  2005 ) . At least one of the authors (CAW) 
has had this unfortunate experience! 
 4.5  Considerations of Genetic Engineering and Gene Transfer 
 4.5.1  Public Perception of GE Microbials 
 During the early stages of the development of GE microorganisms, signi fi cant public 
debate occurred regarding the human health and environmental safety of these novel 
products of biotechnology (Marchant  1988 ; Barinaga  2000 ) . As is often the case with 
public reaction to new technologies, the debate was not always centered on scienti fi c 
facts or reasoned discussion, but was taken up by opponents of biotechnology as a 
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crusade against development of genetically engineered organisms regardless of intent 
or merit. Additionally, debate within the scienti fi c community was needed to develop a 
regulatory system capable of responding to novel products and nuances to the technology 
as they developed. As evidenced by the early  fi eld experiments with ice-minus bacteria 
for frost prevention on strawberries and potatoes (Crawford  1986 ; Marchant  1988 ; 
Barinaga  2000 ) , or the intentional degradation of an oil spill by hydrocarbon munching 
pseudomonads (Van  1989 ) , public and, therefore, political considerations have 
in fl uenced the  fi eld release and commercialization of GE microbes. Others have also 
expressed concerns (Dixon  2008 ) . 
 Consideration of public perception and understanding of this novel technology led 
to business decisions that apparently did not necessarily re fl ect the actual science or 
potential risk associated with the proposed release of a particular GE microbial pest 
control agent. As is the case with GE plants, commercial considerations and the threat 
of lawsuits, with or without merit, persuaded individual concerns to halt research and 
development programs that may have lead to more environmentally benign alternative 
pest management measures (Phil Hutton Personal communication). Although regulatory 
requirements by EPA and USDA-APHIS may result in greater costs and longer lead 
times for commercialization of GE microbial products, we believe that, at least in 
some cases, companies were seeking regulatory approval as a means of indicating the 
safety of these products and did not perceive regulatory requirement as a deterrent to 
application of the products to market (Wrubel et al.  1997 ) . Given the furor over the 
ice-minus and concurrent microbial  fi eld tests, regulatory oversight and approval may 
have enhanced public acceptance. 
 Many years later, as genetic engineering technology has progressed, signi fi cant 
numbers of GE microbial pest control agents exist on the market without the fanfare 
and protests characteristic of the early years of this technology. We believe that this 
bodes well for the potential of this technology to reduce the application of less 
environmentally benign technologies that ultimately have the potential for greater 
environmental effects. 
 4.5.2  Future for GE Microbials in Pest Management 
 The  fi eld of agricultural biotechnology has grown and developed so rapidly in the last 
20 or so years that avenues to be taken, which we had not even anticipated 5 or 
10 years ago, will continue to astound us in the future. The majority of this activity, at 
least in traditional agricultural terms, has been directly through engineering of plants 
for a variety of purposes, while the application of rDNA technology to microbial 
agents for pest and disease control has been slow in comparison. As can be evidenced 
by Table  4.1 , the number of research efforts aimed at pest control through genetic 
engineering of MPCA have been numerous over the years. But, these efforts appear to 
have slowed, as recent actions are relatively few. There is, however, reason to expect 
that this may change in the future, at least in US and Canadian applications. 
 Despite the fact that some individuals are uncomfortable with microbes in gen-
eral, based largely on a lack of understanding and encouraged by germ phobias, the 
instances where genetically engineered microbials have been utilized for nitrogen 
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 fi xation, soil amendments, biological control, and in bioremediation have not garnered 
the negative publicity to the degree that GE crop plants developed for agronomic, 
quality trait, and pest control purposes have. This was clearly not the case early on 
with the advent of biotechnology in agriculture – as was demonstrated by the furor 
over the early ice-minus  fi eld trials with pseudomonads in California or the  fi rst release 
of oil-degrading bacteria for cleanup of petroleum spills in marine environments. 
 The lack of attention to GE MPCA and other microbials may be in part due to the 
continued rancor over GE crops. There is also a common thread of mistrust among 
some of these groups toward large corporate interests (i.e., seed companies) such 
that the continued research and application of GE microbes  fl ies largely under the 
radar of those who claim an innate aversion to this most promising of modern 
technologies. The majority of GE MPCAs are developed by small to mid-size 
companies without the visibility of those heavily involved in crop biotechnology. 
 One must also consider the use of GE microbes in food processing (e.g., chymosin, 
ascorbic acid production,  fl avor enhancers), even in countries where biotechnology 
is publically and of fi cially shunned by many (e.g. the EU; GMO Compass  2010 ) . 
These organisms and their products, when used as food processing aids, fail to trip 
the regulatory requirement for food labeling in stark contrast to those food and feed 
products derived from products of crop biotechnology. Perhaps this level of familiarity 
has garnered some trust with consumers or it simply has not made news enough 
to be noticed. Either way, it could bode well for GE microbial agents applied to 
agriculture and the environment. 
 4.6  TSCA Risk Assessment of Intergeneric Microorganisms 
 4.6.1  TSCA Regulation of Microorganisms 
 The United States Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for reviewing 
the risks associated with the commercial use or importation of chemical substances, 
including certain genetically modi fi ed microorganisms, under Section 5 of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA). TSCA speci fi cally excludes from review certain 
products that are subject to review by other federal agencies or under other statutes, 
including tobacco, nuclear materials, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, and pesticides 
(but not pesticidal intermediates). TSCA’s regulation of microorganisms is limited 
to those microorganisms that are “new”, meaning that they are not listed on the 
TSCA Inventory of Chemical Substances. In this context, “new” microorganisms 
have been de fi ned as those that are intergeneric, meaning that there has been the 
deliberate combination of genetic material originally isolated from organisms 
classi fi ed in different taxonomic genera. Also included in the de fi nition of an intergeneric 
microorganism is a microorganism constructed with synthetic genes that are not identical 
to DNA that would be derived from the same genus as the recipient microorganism. 
Exclusions from TSCA review include naturally occurring microorganisms, as they 
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are considered to be implicitly listed on the TSCA Inventory, genetically engineered 
microorganisms other than intergeneric (e.g., intrageneric, physical or chemically 
mutagenized microorganisms), and intergeneric microorganisms resulting only 
from the addition of well-characterized, non-coding regulatory regions. TSCA section 
5 only applies to microorganisms that are manufactured, imported, or processed for 
commercial purposes. 
 Intergeneric microorganisms subject to review under TSCA include a wide variety 
of biotechnological applications since TSCA is a gap- fi lling statute for biotechnology 
products not regulated under other statutes. Intergeneric microorganisms that may 
be subject to review under the Biotechnology Rule (40 CFR Parts 700,720, 721, 
723, and 725 Microbial Products of Biotechnology: Final Regulation Under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, FR Vol 62 No. 70 17909–17958, April 11, 1997) 
may be in applications including but not limited to biofuel production, biomass 
conversion, waste treatment, bioremediation, biomining, mineral leaching, oil 
recovery, desulfurization of fossil fuels, biofertilizers, biosensors, closed system 
fermentation for the production of enzymes and specialty chemicals, and pesticidal 
intermediates. Among these, biofertilizers (e.g., nitrogen  fi xers, mycorrhizae, phosphate 
solubilizers, etc.), algal biofuels, pesticidal intermediates, and perhaps, biosensors 
could have agricultural uses. 
 4.6.2  Categories of Premanufacturing Oversight 
 4.6.2.1  Microbial Commercial Activity Notice (MCAN) 
 Prior to manufacture or importation of an intergeneric microorganism, companies must 
make an appropriate submission to EPA’s Of fi ce of Pollution Prevention and Toxics 
(OPPT). Subpart D of part 725 of the Biotechnology Rule establishes the reporting 
program for new microorganisms. New microorganisms that are to be manufactured or 
imported for distribution into commerce requires the submission of a Microbial 
Commercial Activity Notice (MCAN) 90 days prior to initiating manufacture or import, 
unless the activity is eligible for one of the speci fi c exemptions. 
 The purpose of the MCAN is to supply EPA with information necessary to iden-
tify and list the new microorganism on the TSCA Inventory of Chemical Substances, 
and to determine whether the microorganism and the associated manufacture or 
importation may present an unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the 
environment. The MCAN information requirements closely parallel those developed 
for traditional chemical Premanufacturing Notices and differ only to the extent 
necessary to accommodate the speci fi c characteristics of living microorganisms 
versus chemicals. All information on the microorganism identity and data on its 
actual and potential effects on human health and the environment that are available 
to the submitter, or are reasonably ascertainable are required in the MCAN. A detailed 
description of the genetic modi fi cations to the recipient microorganism is necessary, 
along with data on the stability of inserted genetic material in the production strain 
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and the potential for transfer of this material to other organisms in the environment. 
In addition, a detailed complete description of the manufacturing process and 
design, production volumes, and containment and inactivation procedures are 
required. The requirements for information to be included in the MCAN are codi fi ed 
at § 725.155 and § 725.160. 
 4.6.2.2  Exemptions from Full Premanufacturing Noti fi cation 
 Research and Development Exemption 
 One exemption from MCAN reporting is the R&D Exemption. This is a complete 
exemption from TSCA § 5 reporting for certain R&D activities that are (1) conducted 
in contained structures, and (2) are subject to regulation by another Federal agency. 
As discussed in Subpart E of the Biotechnology Rule and codi fi ed at § 725.232, 
activities that meet these criteria are exempt from EPA review, reporting, and record 
keeping requirements for contained research conducted by researchers who are 
required to comply with the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant 
DNA Molecules ( http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih_guidelines_oba.html ). 
 Other manufacturers conducting contained TSCA research and development 
activities that are not subject to regulation by the NIH Guidelines may qualify for a 
more limited contained R&D exemption under § 725.234 and § 725.235. This 
exemption for R&D in contained structures speci fi es factors that a technically 
quali fi ed individual (TQI) must consider in selecting the appropriate containment 
for this exemption. A structure is de fi ned as a building or vessel which effectively 
surrounds and encloses the microorganism and includes features designed to restrict 
the microorganism from leaving. In proposing the Biotech Rule, EPA envisioned 
that this exemption would most likely apply to research performed in contained 
structures such as buildings, including laboratories, greenhouses, and pilot fermen-
tation plants. etc., and in certain bioreactors used for waste treatment. However, 
other forms of structures could be used. EPA’s approach relies on the experience 
and judgment of the TQI, recognizing that many different kinds of microorganisms 
displaying a wide range of characteristics could potentially be used in research. 
It also recognizes that appropriate types of controls (e.g., procedural. mechanical. 
and/or engineering) will vary with the microorganism and type of research. EPA 
expects that the TQI will be cognizant of these factors when selecting containment 
and inactivation controls appropriate to the microorganism(s) being utilized. The tech-
nically quali fi ed individual is required to keep records to document both compliance 
with the containment requirements and compliance with the noti fi cation process for 
employees involved in the R&D process. 
 A major consideration of the R&D exemption in a contained structure is the struc-
ture itself. EPA may interpret the de fi nition of a structure broadly given the intention 
of freely permitting research with contained microorganisms that meet the criteria of 
§ 725.234. However, EPA encourages potential researchers who wish to perform 
their research in atypical contained structures to confer with EPA prior to initiating 
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their effort to con fi rm that the structure is considered “contained”. There may be 
instances in which a TSCA Environmental Release Application (TERA), which is a 
submission for  fi eld testing or intentional environmental release, may be required if 
the structure is not deemed “contained” (see below for TERA requirements). 
 Tier I and Tier II Exemptions 
 There are exemptions from MCAN reporting for certain industrial microorganisms 
used in closed systems so they likely have limited, if any, relevance to typical agri-
cultural applications. As described in Subpart G, these Tier I and Tier II exemptions 
for closed systems are based on a three-pronged approach: use of a microorganism 
with a history of safe use, criteria that ensure the safety of the introduced DNA, and 
conditions for containment and inactivation of the microorganism to ensure low 
releases from the manufacturing/production facility. To qualify for the Tier I exemption, 
a manufacturer must use one of the ten recipient organisms listed at § 725.420 that 
have undergone categorical risk assessment, or any such microorganism subsequently 
listed after promulgation of the Biotechnology Rule through a petition process 
described in § 725.67. Currently, the eligible recipient microorganisms include the 
 fi ve bacteria  Acetobacter aceti, Bacillus licheniformis, Bacillus subtilis, Clostridium 
acetobutylicum, Escherichia coli K-12, and the  fi ve fungi  Aspergillus niger, A. oryzae, 
Penicillium roqueforti, Sacharromyces cerevisiae, and  S. uvarum. In addition to the 
use of an approved recipient microorganism, there are four criteria for the genetic 
material introduced into these strains. There are also speci fi c criteria for releases 
from the manufacturing facility and for inactivation of liquid and solid waste streams. 
For those manufacturers meeting Tier I requirements, only a brief noti fi cation to the 
Agency stating that fact is necessary. A manufacturer, who meets only the  fi rst two 
conditions of the Tier I exemption, but not the containment and inactivation criteria 
must submit a Tier II exemption notice to the Agency for a review of the process 
design and containment/inactivation conditions appropriate for the intergeneric 
microorganism. 
 Test Marketing Exemption (TME) 
 Another exemption from MCAN reporting requirements is the Test Marketing 
Exemption (TME) noted at § 725.300. Test marketing activities usually involve 
limited sale or distribution of a substance within a predetermined period of time to 
determine its competitive value when its market is uncertain. In general, EPA suggests 
that manufacturers who intend to test market a new microorganism  fi le a MCAN 
rather than request a Test Marketing Exemption. However, there may be situations 
in which this exemption is appropriate, such as for microorganisms which were 
previously reviewed by EPA at the R&D stage. In addition to the general administrative 
requirements, certain technical information is required for each TME submission 
as noted in § 725.350 and § 725.355. 
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 4.6.2.3  TSCA Experimental Release Application (TERA) 
 Another exemption from MCAN reporting requirements is available for R&D 
activities. The TSCA Experimental Release Application, described in Subpart E at 
§ 725.238, is an exemption for R&D involving an intentional environmental release 
of an intergeneric microorganism. This exemption is likely to be a common one for 
many agricultural uses (e.g., biofertilizers, algae for biofuel production), as they 
generally involve  fi eld tests or may involve some release of subject microorganisms. 
Also, as previously mentioned, a TERA may be necessary for some contained R&D 
activities if such R&D is conducted in an atypical structure that does not meet the 
regulatory de fi nition of a contained structure. The TERA is essentially an abbrevi-
ated MCAN for a  fi eld test or other intentional environmental introduction with a 
shortened review period of 60 days, although EPA may extend the review period for 
good cause. EPA must approve the TERA, with or without conditions, before the 
researcher may proceed, even if the 60-day period expires. EPA’s approval is limited 
to the conditions outlined in the TERA notice and approval for the speci fi c  fi eld test 
at the speci fi ed site(s). 
 A TERA must contain all available data in the possession or control of the sub-
mitter or reasonably ascertainable by the submitter on the microorganism(s) and the 
research and development activities that will allow EPA to make a reasoned evalua-
tion of the planned test in the environment. The TERA must contain microorganism 
identity information and all available data concerning actual or potential effects on 
health or the environment of the new microorganism along with the phenotypic and 
ecological characteristics of the microorganism as they relate directly to the conditions 
of the proposed R&D activity. Persons applying for a TERA must also submit 
information about the proposed  fi eld testing activity including the objectives and 
signi fi cance of the activity with a rationale for testing in the environment, the numbers 
and frequency of microorganisms released by the proposed application method(s), 
the presence of target organisms, if applicable, and a full characterization of the test 
site(s) including location, geographical, physical, chemical, and biological features, 
and proximity to human habitation or activity. Also needed is a description of 
con fi nement procedures, mitigation and emergency procedures, and procedures for 
routine termination of the activity. The exact information requirements for a TERA 
are codi fi ed at § 725.255 and § 725.260. 
 Exemptions from a TERA for Eligible Microorganisms 
 There is an exemption from TERA reporting requirements for R&D  fi eld testing of 
two microorganisms with which EPA has had suf fi cient experience to determine 
that a submission is no longer needed. The exemption applies to two eligible micro-
organisms,  Bradyrhizobium japonicum and  Sinorhizobium (formerly  Rhizobium ) 
 meliloti ) providing certain conditions of the microorganisms and of the  fi eld testing 
are met. The introduced genetic material must comply with certain restrictions, the 
 fi eld testing must occur on no more than 10 terrestrial acres, and appropriate 
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containment measures must be selected to limit dissemination (see § 725.238 and 
§ 725.239). 
 This TERA Exemption requires no upfront reporting to EPA, although a 
certi fi cation statement and recordkeeping are required. Guidance on how to submit 
a certi fi cation statement to EPA and on the recordkeeping requirements for  fi eld 
tests with these bacteria is provided at § 725.238. 
 4.6.3  Risk Assessment Process 
 Within the speci fi ed time period for each type of submission, EPA staff conduct a 
risk assessment on the intergeneric microorganism under the paradigm that 
Risk = Hazard × Exposure. There are a number of separate assessments made that are 
integrated into a  fi nal risk assessment. The components of the risk assessment include 
(1) a veri fi cation of the identi fi cation of the subject microorganism, (2) a human 
health hazard assessment, (3) an ecological effects hazard assessment, (4) a report 
that analyzes the construction of the microorganism and summarizes the pertinent 
chemical information and production volume known as the chemistry report, (5) an 
analysis of the genetic construct that evaluates any potential hazards associated with 
the genetic modi fi cations and the potential for horizontal gene transfer, (6) an 
engineering report that assesses worker exposure and microbial releases to the 
environment through manufacturing or during  fi eld applications, and (7) an exposure 
assessment that evaluates the potential for survival, reproduction, and dissemination 
of the microorganism, and the exposure of the microorganism to environmental 
receptors and to the general population. 
 As noted below, there is no provision for a speci fi ed schedule of information 
elements under TSCA. Rather submitters must provide to EPA all relevant data and 
information in their possession or reasonably ascertainable. These data must be 
suf fi cient to enable EPA to complete a risk assessment. If a submission of any type 
contains insuf fi cient information to proceed with a review, EPA may request an 
extension from the submitter to allow the submitter to provide the necessary information. 
EPA also has risk management options that may be employed to mitigate the effect 
of uncertainty due to data or information limitations as described below. 
 Since TSCA is a risk-bene fi t statute, the risks of using the microorganism 
determined in the risk assessment are weighed against the bene fi ts to society (that 
are evaluated in an economics analysis) to arrive at the  fi nal risk management 
decision. Possible outcomes of the review process include a determination that there 
is (1) suf fi cient information to determine that the microorganism presents “no 
unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the environment” in which case the 
Agency takes no regulatory action and the company may commence manufacture 
after 90 days, (2) suf fi cient information to determine that the microorganism presents 
“an unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the environment” which means 
the Agency would take regulatory action to prohibit or restrict the production or use 
of the microorganism, and (3) insuf fi cient information to determine effects, but the 
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possibility exists for unreasonable risk and/or substantial/signi fi cant exposure, in 
which case the Agency may negotiate a Section 5(e) Consent Order to restrict the use, 
and to specify the data needed to lift the Consent Order. The key element to the 
possible outcomes of EPA’s review process is the amount of information that the 
Agency is supplied with or can obtain concerning the microorganism in order to 
make a determination of whether or not the use of the microorganism presents an 
unacceptable risk of injury to human health or the environment. 
 4.6.4  Data and Information Needs 
 Unlike many other statutes under which biotechnology products are reviewed, 
TSCA does not have speci fi c initial data requirements. Rather, the submitter is 
required to provide relevant data and information that are available or reasonably 
ascertainable with the noti fi cation to EPA. In contrast, with microbial pest control 
agents (MPCAs) which are reviewed by EPA’s Of fi ce of Pesticide Programs (OPP) 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), there are a 
number of speci fi c pathogenicity/toxicity/infectivity tests that must be conducted 
and submitted to the Agency. MPCAs, by their very nature, are designed to be either 
pathogenic or toxic to some pest, and consequently, their effects of pathogenicity/
toxicity are fairly straightforward. The microorganisms that fall under TSCA review 
differ in that most are not likely pathogenic or toxic, but primarily are benign recipient 
microorganisms genetically engineered to synthesize a particular product or accom-
plish a particular task or transformation. 
 Obtaining suf fi cient information about the submission microorganism from the 
manufacturer or importer so that a scienti fi cally credible risk assessment can be 
conducted by the Agency is critical to the review process. Information needs match 
the set of individual assessments (e.g., human health, ecological effects, etc.) that go 
into the comprehensive risk assessment described previously. Since combinations of 
microorganism and proposed use can vary widely, EPA prepared a guidance document, 
“Points to Consider in the Preparation of TSCA Biotechnology Submissions for 
Microorganisms, June 2, 1997” (hereafter referred to as the Points to Consider 
document). This document is intended to assist manufacturers or importers in providing 
EPA’s Of fi ce of Pollution Prevention and Toxics with both appropriate and suf fi cient 
information for EPA to conduct a robust risk assessment. It is intended that the Points 
to Consider document be a “living document” in that it will be updated periodically to 
re fl ect state-of-the-art biotechnological applications, risk assessment methodology, 
and current knowledge of microbial processes and characterization. 
 Although there are no data requirements that are applied routinely to each case, 
information that is both accurate and suf fi cient is necessary to evaluate the risks 
posed by the manufacture and use of genetically modi fi ed microorganisms. Each 
submitter must supply, as part of its noti fi cation requirements, all relevant data 
and information in its possession, or that is otherwise reasonably ascertainable. 
Information available in the literature or from sources other than the submitter is also 
used by the Agency in the evaluation of the hazards posed by the microorganism 
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and its ability to survive in the environment. The effects of genetic modi fi cations of 
the recipient microorganism are then evaluated. For instance, if a recipient bacterium 
is known from the literature not to be a frank human pathogen, then it is unlikely 
that the introduction of one or several genes will create a pathogenic microorganism 
 de novo . Likewise, if from the literature it is known that the recipient microorganism 
survives well in the environment, then the intergeneric microorganism also might be 
expected to survive well depending on whether the genetic modi fi cation altered any 
genes key to its survival characteristics. The Points to Consider document has been 
provided to guide submitters in selecting all the relevant information that the Agency 
may need for the review of all possible types of microorganisms and applications 
that may be subject to review under TSCA. All of the points or issues in the guidance 
document may not be appropriate for all cases. This document is not a schedule of 
data requirements but rather essentially a menu of data elements from which submitters 
are expected to choose the ones relevant to their particular microorganism and 
application. For example, information on substrate range and metabolic pathways 
may be applicable for a microorganism designed for bioremediation, but would be 
irrelevant for a microorganism designed for symbiotic nitrogen  fi xation. Identi fi cation 
of possible nontargets, i.e., potential legume hosts, may be important for symbiotic 
nitrogen- fi xing rhizobia, but irrelevant to a microorganism used in a closed system 
for making an algal biofuel. 
 4.6.5  Applications of Genetically Engineered 
Microorganisms Reviewed to Date 
 4.6.5.1  Past Applications 
 A wide variety of intergeneric microorganisms have been reviewed under TSCA 
since the mid 1980s. Prior to the promulgation of the Biotechnology Rule in 1997, 
intergeneric microorganisms with TSCA uses were reviewed on a voluntary basis 
under the chemical Pre-Manufacturing Noti fi cation (PMN) system. Those interge-
neric microorganisms and their genetic modi fi cations with relevance to agriculture 
are listed in Table  4.2 . 
 Following the promulgation of the Microbial Biotechnology Rule, various sub-
missions types discussed above for intergeneric microorganisms have been received 
by the Agency. The majority of the submissions reviewed by EPA since publication 
of the Biotechnology Rule have been for closed system fermentation for enzyme 
production which were not relevant to agriculture, and thus, will not be elaborated on 
here. A complete list of all intergeneric microorganisms reviewed under TSCA to 
date can be obtained on the Biotechnology Program’s website ( http://www.epa.gov/
oppt/biotech ) under Noti fi cations. 
 Table  4.3 presents those intergeneric microorganisms reviewed by EPA under 
TSCA since the promulgation of the Biotechnology Rule, having relevance to 
agriculture, all of which were TERA submissions. 
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 4.6.5.2  Potential Future Applications 
 Biofertilizers 
 As previously mentioned, there are many biotechnology applications of genetically 
engineered microorganisms that potentially may fall under the purview of TSCA 
including a number of uses that are relevant to agriculture. These include intergeneric 
microorganisms used as biofertilizers such as symbiotic nitrogen- fi xers such as 
 Sinorhizobium meliloti and  Bradyrhizobium japonicum . Field tests of numerous inter-
generic rhizobia have gone through review under TSCA, and one particular strain of  S. 
meliloti, RMBPC-2, was approved in 1997 for limited commercialization. In the future, 
there could be more submissions for more rhizobia for increased nitrogen- fi xation abil-
ity, or perhaps, for enhanced nodulation ef fi ciency. In addition, applications for other 
symbiotic nitrogen  fi xers, such as the actinomycete  Frankia which is a Gram positive 
bacterium that forms symbiotic relationships with certain plants such as woody angio-
sperms referred to as actinorhizal plants, are a possibility. There may also be submis-
sions for free-living nitrogen  fi xing microorganisms. In addition to nitrogen- fi xing 
intergeneric microorganisms, other biofertilizer applications that would be reviewed 
under TSCA include phosphate-solubilizing microorganisms, mycorrhizal fungi, or 
other endophytic microorganisms that aid in nutrient absorption, plant hormone pro-
duction, or other mechanisms that may increase plant productivity.
Biosensors 
 Microbial biosensors consist of the use of a microorganism that has some sort of 
reporter molecule that indicates the presence of a target molecule. The reporter genes 
used in recombinant DNA technology for microbial biosensors include those that can 
result in a signal that can be visible to the naked eye such as color production (e.g., 
blue color resulting from the breakdown of X-galactopyranoside by  b -galactosidase), 
bioluminescence (e.g.,  luc or  lux genes), or  fl uorescence (e.g.  gfp or DsRed). One of 
the earliest genetically engineered microorganisms to be  fi eld tested was Monsanto’s 
 Pseudomonas chlororaphis (formerly  P. aureofaciens ) into which the  b -galactosi-
dase gene was inserted to enable detection of the microorganism in the environment. 
The  A. xylosoxidans reviewed under TSCA that was eventually to be manipulated 
with pesticidal genes contained the DsRed protein for detection the microorganism 
in the environment as well. Other biosensors with reporter genes for detection of 
particular target molecules have been reviewed under TSCA as well. One such bio-
sensor was a strain of  Pseudomonas  fl uorescens Hk44 containing  lux biolumines-
cence genes for detection of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons including naphthalene 
and methyl salicylate. Another reporter biosensor was a strain of  Pseudomonas 
putida with genes for detection of unexploded ordinance, speci fi cally trinitrotoluene 
(TNT). Another biosensor microorganism, a  P. putida containing  lux genes was 
reviewed that was developed for detection of trichloroethylene (TCE) and BTEX 
compounds (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene). Other genetically engi-
neered microbial biosensors have been developed for  in situ detection of metals such 
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as cadmium, nickel, cobalt, different forms of mercury, arsenite, and other heavy 
metals such as copper, zinc, and lead (as summarized in Shin  2010 ) . 
 Potentially, there could be a number of biosensor applications developed that 
would be relevant to agriculture that would be subject to review under TSCA. Future 
developments could include the use of intergeneric microorganisms as biosensors for 
detection of bioterrorist agents, detection of other environmental pollutants, including 
pesticides, some of which may have relevance to agriculture. Other potential agricultural 
uses could be development of microbial biosensors for detection of pathogenic strains 
of  E. coli or  Salmonella in the environment, for instance, in irrigation water, in soils, 
in manures and other fertilizers that are used for food crop production. These types 
of biosensors may be particularly useful for produce often consumed raw such as 
lettuces, spinach, onions, etc. However, a biosensor such as this, if used to monitor 
contamination on the actual food product rather than the environment in which the 
crop is growing, would fall under the jurisdiction of the FDA rather than EPA. Other 
agriculturally relevant future biosensors could be for monitoring nutrient or water 
status of soils or contamination of water used in crop production or in aquaculture. 
 Pesticidal Intermediates 
 Pesticidal intermediates are an agricultural application reviewed under TSCA, and 
several of these were reviewed in the 1980s. A pesticidal intermediate is a live 
microorganism producing a pesticide that contains only inactivated microorganisms. 
The  fi nal pesticide product containing dead microorganisms is reviewed by EPA’s 
Of fi ce of Pesticide Programs under FIFRA. However, the live microorganism used in 
the production of the pesticide is reviewed under TSCA as a pesticidal intermediate. 
Future submissions of pesticidal intermediates may also be expected. 
 Weather Modi fi cation 
 Some of the earliest biotechnology applications involving intergeneric microorgan-
isms involved those in weather modi fi cation. There was the ice-minus  Pseudomonas 
syringae for prevention of frost damage on strawberries. The commercial product 
called Snomax is a strain of  P. syringae that increases the nucleation temperature of 
water, thereby increasing snow volume. Since strains of  P. syringae are known plant 
pathogens, USDA had the lead in reviewing these two products in the 1980s under 
the Plant Protection Act. However, any such weather modi fi cation product produced 
in the future using an intergeneric microorganism that did not fall under review by 
another federal agency would be reviewed under TSCA. 
 Algal Biomass for Fuels and Other Uses Such as Animal Feeds, Aquaculture 
Feed, Etc 
 Currently there are extensive R&D activities on using algae as a biofuel feedstock. 
Characteristics of microalgae production that are advantageous include high biomass 
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yields per acre, a lack of competition for arable land and sometimes nutrients, the 
use of waste water, produced water, or saline water, the recycling of carbon through 
use of CO 2 from industrial  fl ue gas or other sources, and because production is 
compatible with an integrated biore fi nery concept. Other aspects of microalgal culture 
include rapid growth rate, high cell density, and high oil content. Algae may be able 
to produce several fuel types including gaseous compounds like hydrogen and 
methane, as well as a range of conventional liquid hydrocarbons. Most of the current 
focus with algal biofuels is on the development of liquid transportation fuels including 
gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. 
 The U.S. Department of Energy biofuels roadmap (US DOE  2010 ) addressed 
many aspects of this rapidly developing industry, including the variety of algal types, 
methods to cultivate them, and processes to recover oil from them. Algae can be 
grown photosynthetically using natural daylight or with arti fi cial lighting. Heterotrophic 
algae can be grown much like other industrial microorganisms via continuous culture 
in the dark although when grown this way, they require a  fi xed carbon source such as 
sugars. There are two primary cultivation approaches with many variations. 
Photobioreactors utilize closed cycle recirculation systems employing either ambient 
light or arti fi cial illumination. Open pond production facilities are generally raceway 
ponds of a recirculating design using pumps and paddle wheels to circulate water, 
algae, and nutrients through shallow open ponds. Hybrid systems growing algae in the 
environment may also be used, however perhaps with enclosures such as plastic bags, 
to contain the algae rather than growing them in the open. 
 Commercial fuel production from algae is in its infancy, but the growth of algae 
for commercial production of high-value end products such as pharmaceuticals and 
“nutraceuticals” has existed for some time. Products such as carotenoids, phycobi-
lins, fatty acids, polysaccharides, vitamins, sterols, and biologically active mole-
cules for use in human and animal health are produced by algae commercially 
(Oilgae  2010 ) . Any intergeneric algae used for biofuel production would be reviewed 
under TSCA. Although these high-value end products other than fuels mentioned 
above would be reviewed by other federal agencies, TSCA would be involved if the 
algae were also producing biofuels. 
 4.7  Conclusions 
 Regulation of genetically engineered microbial agents, whether for pest manage-
ment purposes or environmental bioremediation, has afforded the proper oversight 
of a novel technology as part of a larger attempt to reduce the uncertainty of the risk 
assessment process. With the advent of a new technology, uncertainties and lack of 
a proven track record necessitate thorough review of these microbes to ensure 
human health and environmental safety (Harrison and Bonning  2000 ) . While the 
addition of a transgene to a familiar microbial genome may alter the phenotype of 
the microbe, these microbes are guided by the same biochemical and genetic processes 
as naturally occurring microbes (NRC  2000 ). Hence, they were assessed with that 
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fact in mind, albeit under an initial higher level of scrutiny and oversight. As indicated 
by Wrubel et al.  ( 1997 ) , decisions regarding further research and development of 
GE MPCA products may have been considerably in fl uenced by unknowns in 
regulatory oversight, however, in the majority of cases an inability of the proposed 
product to live up to expectations was the driving force behind a products demise. 
One must not discount the perceived in fl uence of public acceptance and its relationship 
to marketing of products, particularly when they involve food and feed. 
 Reports from the early  fi eld experiments with GE bacteria reveal how controver-
sial and polarizing these  fi rst ventures were in the public arena (Grif fi n  1988 ; Berg 
and Singer  1995 ) . Today this is largely not the case, although many have learned 
the value in public education and involvement in  fi eld testing novel technologies. 
It is still possible, however, to emote fear of the unknown without really intending 
to (Dixon  2008 ) . 
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